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ABSTRACT 
The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented significant civil 
infrastructure rebuilding challenges to these nations, as well as to the United States, 
coalition allies, and the United Nations.  Iraqi and Afghan critical infrastructure has been 
destroyed, or fallen into disrepair, due to years of war, international sanctions, sabotage 
and neglect.  Electrical infrastructure, in particular, is a critical economic and social 
component that is failing to meet the essential needs of these two societies.  This paper is 
a starting point in researching the viability of integrating distributed generation (DG) 
resources, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and microturbines into the portfolio 
of power generation choices, by quantifying the fully burdened cost of electrical 
generation in war-torn regions.  In this paper, Iraq is used as the sample case for 
investigating the viability of using DG technologies to enhance the existing electric grid.  
The fully burdened cost is expressed in the annual life-cycle cost (LCC) of each of the 
five systems (microturbines, diesel generators, photovoltaic panels, wind turbines and 
large-scale natural gas turbines) researched, “levelized” to $/kW.  LCC includes capital 
costs, operation and maintenance, fuel costs, energy storage and security.  This research 
concludes that microturbine systems offer the most cost effective means of making up a 
3500MW deficit in Iraq when fuel prices remain at, or below, a baseline price of 
$2.29/gal FY09.  Photovoltaic systems provide the most cost effective means of making 
up this deficit when fuel prices increase beyond this baseline price, as they have in 
Afghanistan.   
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
DISCLAIMER 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................1 
A. CRIPPLED INFRASTRUCTURE.................................................................1 
B. DECENTRALIZATION .................................................................................4 
1. Iraq’s Current Network Architecture ...............................................4 
2. The Cost of Oil .....................................................................................7 
a. Current Military Energy Considerations .................................7 
3. A Tactical Argument for Diversification and Decentralization ......8 
4. Closing the Delta ................................................................................10 
II. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND MICROGRIDS ........................................11 
A. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION DEFINED...............................................11 
B. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES................................12 
1. Microturbines.....................................................................................12 
2. Reciprocating Engines .......................................................................13 
3. Photovoltaic Systems .........................................................................14 
4. Wind Turbine Systems ......................................................................17 
C. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION PROS AND CONS ................................18 
D. MICROGRID DEFINED..............................................................................20 
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ..............................................................................25 
A. DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE .........................................................25 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS .....................................................25 
C. LIST OF PROBLEM ALTERNATIVES ....................................................28 
1.   Existing Methods................................................................................28 
2.   Alternatives.........................................................................................28 
3.   Infeasible Alternatives .......................................................................29 
D. DATA ..............................................................................................................29 
1.   Data Collection...................................................................................29 
2.   Data Set Design ..................................................................................30 
a.  Initial (Capital) Costs..............................................................31 
b.  O&M Costs ..............................................................................32 
c.  Fuel Costs................................................................................33 
d.  Energy Storage Costs ..............................................................35 
e.  Security Costs ..........................................................................37 
3.   Data Normalization............................................................................40 
4.   Life-Cycle Cost ...................................................................................41 
E. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS..........................................................................42 
1.   Deficit Analysis...................................................................................42 
2.   LCC vs. Fuel Price Analysis..............................................................46 
F. ANALYSIS OF COSTS.................................................................................48 
G. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES.......................................................49 
H. SENSITIVITY AND RISK ANALYSES.....................................................52 
I.   ANALYSIS SUMMATION...........................................................................54 
 x
IV. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................57 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON WORK.........................................59 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................61 




LIST OF FIGURES 
ES Figure 1: System Fuel v. Security Preference ............................................................... xiii 
Figure 1: Average Monthly Electrical Production in Iraq (MW) (Source Data:  
Brookings Institute Iraq Index, Jan. 2009).........................................................2 
Figure 2: Average Monthly Electrical Production, 2001-2006. (From: April 2008 
SIGIR Report to Congress, Figures 2-32)..........................................................3 
Figure 3: Typical Large-scale U.S. Generation and Distribution System (From:  
DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Website, 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/) ...............................................................................4 
Figure 4: Iraq Electrical Grid as of 2006 (From:  IEEE Spectrum Online Article, 
"Re-engineering Iraq,” Feb. 2006.)....................................................................5 
Figure 5: Capstone Microturbines (Source:  Capstone Turbine Coorperation) ..............12 
Figure 6: Caterpillar Model 3406C 300kW Reciprocating Diesel Generator (Source:  
Caterpillar) .......................................................................................................13 
Figure 7: Photovoltaic panels ..........................................................................................14 
Figure 8: Bergey Skystream Model BWC EXCEL 10 kW Wind Turbine (Source:  
Bergey Windpower).........................................................................................17 
Figure 9: Microgrid Example (Source:  Sandia National Labs White Paper, 
"Microgrid Characterization in the United States,” p. 15)...............................21 
Figure 10: Microgrid Characteristics (From:  Sandia National Labs Report, 
“Characterization of Microgrids,” 2005. .........................................................22 
Figure 11: EPA Estimated Gas Turbine Non-Fuel O&M Costs (FY$00) (From:  EPA 
Report, p. 18) ...................................................................................................33 
Figure 12: Est. Large-Scale O&M Costs as a Function of Generation Capacity (After:  
EPA Report, p. 18)...........................................................................................33 
Figure 13:  EPA Estimated Gas Turbine Fuel Flow (Input—MMBTU/hr) (From:  
EPA Report, p. 8).............................................................................................34 
Figure 14: Large-Scale Gas Turbine Gen. Capacity to Fuel Flow Rate Trend Analysis 
(After:  EPA Report, p. 8)................................................................................35 
Figure 15:  Annual Cost Components for 8-hr Bulk Energy Storage Technologies 
(From:  Sandia National Labs Report SAND2007-4253)................................37 
Figure 16: High Security Generalized, Quantitative Security Threat Matrix ...................39 
Figure 17: NCCP Inflation Calculator...............................................................................41 
Figure 18: Cost to Make up Annual Iraqi Gen. Capacity Deficit of 3500MW using 
Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies ...............................................................43 
 xii
Figure 19: Cost to Make up Annual Iraqi Gen. Deficit of 3500MW with 
Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies in a High Security Threat 
Environment.....................................................................................................44 
Figure 20: Cost to Make Up Annual Iraqi Gen. Deficit of 3500MW with 
Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies in Low Security Threat Environment ...45 
Figure 21: Production Cost Comparison:  Annual LCC ($1K/kW) vs. Incremental 
Increase in Fuel Prices ($/gal)..........................................................................47 
Figure 22: Production Cost Comparison:  Annual $1K/kW vs. Incremental Increase 
in Fuel Prices ($/MMBTU)..............................................................................48 
Figure 23: Electrical Generation Cost Comparison without Security Level Multiplier 
(Average K/kW, $FY09) .................................................................................49 
Figure 24: High Security Threat Impact on Generation Life-Cycle Costs........................51 
Figure 25: Low Security Threat Impact on Generation Life-Cycle Costs ........................52 
Figure 26: High Security Threat Production Costs with a 2000% Increase in Fuel 
Prices................................................................................................................53 
Figure 27: Low Security Threat Production Costs with a 2000% increase in Fuel 
Prices................................................................................................................54 





The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented significant civil 
infrastructure rebuilding challenges to these nations, as well as to the United States, 
coalition allies, and the United Nations.  Iraqi and Afghan critical infrastructure has been 
destroyed, or fallen into disrepair, due to years of war, international sanctions, sabotage 
and neglect.  Electrical infrastructure, in particular, is a critical economic and social 
component that is failing to meet the essential needs of these two societies.  This paper is 
a starting point in researching the viability of integrating distributed generation (DG) 
resources, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and microturbines into the portfolio 
of power generation choices, by quantifying the fully burdened cost of electricity 
generation.   
In this research, Iraq serves as the case study for investigating the viability of 
using DG technologies to enhance the existing electric grid.  The fully burdened cost is 
expressed in the annual life-cycle cost (LCC) of each of the five systems (microturbines, 
diesel generators, photovoltaic panels, wind turbines and large-scale natural gas turbines) 
researched, “levelized” to $/kW.  LCC includes capital costs, operation and maintenance, 
fuel costs, energy storage and security.   
 
ES Figure 1: System Fuel v. Security Preference 
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As ES Figure 1 illustrates, microturbines offer the most cost effective means of 
making up the average annual 3500MW deficit in Iraq when fuel prices remain at, or 
below, a baseline price of $2.29/gal FY09, and there is either no security threat, or a high 
security threat.  In both of these cases, photovoltaic systems offer a secondary choice.  
When fuel prices remain at baseline, and the security threat is low, microturbines remain 
the primary choice, but small-scale diesel generators become a secondary choice.   
When fuel prices increase by 2000 % from the FY09 baseline price, an increase 
that corresponds with the true price currently being paid in the Afghanistan theater, 
photovoltaic systems provide the most cost effective means of making up the 3500MW 
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I. BACKGROUND  
A. CRIPPLED INFRASTRUCTURE 
The U.S. led wars against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented 
significant civil infrastructure rebuilding challenges to these respective nations, as well 
as to the United States, coalition allies and the United Nations.  The destruction and 
disrepair of Iraqi and Afghan critical infrastructure are a direct result of years of civil 
and border conflicts, international sanctions, sabotage and neglect, and the current 
conflicts.  Electrical infrastructure, in particular, is a backbone component that is failing 
to meet the essential needs of these two societies.  The result is that electrical production 
in Iraq and Afghanistan is not keeping pace with demand.   
Several recent publications, such as the U.S. Army’s 2006 Counterinsurgency 
Manual, and the USMC/USSOC’s 2006 Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 
have stated that effective counterinsurgency/irregular warfare tactics must include 
redeveloping key civilian infrastructure.  In essence, the battle for the hearts and minds 
of a population in turmoil is won when they are afforded the tools for successful 
economic development and modern conveniences.   
Iraq has the world’s fourth largest proven oil reserve, and as of 2006 was the 
world’s fifteenth largest producer (Energy Information Agency 2008).  Fuel oil is the 
primary source of electrical production in the country.  Thus, oil and electrical 
generation are currently inseparable.  Because both are infrastructure intensive 
industries, the entire centralized system is easily targeted and disrupted.    According to 
the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, from June 2003 to March 2008, there 
have been 469 individual attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure alone (Institute for the 
Analysis of Global Security 2008).   
In October 2008, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
suggested that $25-30 billion would be required to rebuild Iraq’s electrical 
infrastructure.  Iraq’s 2006-2015 Electricity Master Plan estimates that $27 billion is 
needed to reach its goal of providing reliable (24-hour) electricity across Iraq by 2015 
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(GAO 2007). The United States and her coalition partners have dedicated considerable 
resources to rebuild electrical generation and distribution capacity.  As of the end of 
2008, the U.S. has expended $4.42 billion of an obligated $4.65 billion to rebuild and 
rehabilitate the electrical sector (Bowen 2008).  Yet, it was not until June of 2008 that 
capacity began to increase and maintain gains above the pre-war levels of 4500 MW per 





















Figure 1: Average Monthly Electrical Production in Iraq (MW) (Source Data:  
Brookings Institute Iraq Index, Jan. 2009) 
The March 2008 Department of Defense Report to Congress cites several 
reasons for this lag in capacity:  fuel shortages, reduced water levels at hydroelectric 
plants, interdictions, equipment failures, damage to key transmission lines, and reliance 
on unreliable imported sources of power (Department of Defense 2008).  Electrical 
demand, on the other hand, has continued to fluctuate around the 8000 MW per month 
mark for the past several years (see Figure 2).  In 2008, average monthly production was 
4500 MW, resulting in an average negative production deficit of approximately 3500 




Figure 2: Average Monthly Electrical Production, 2001-2006. (From: April 
2008 SIGIR Report to Congress, Figures 2-32) 
Demand is met as security in the country increases and is maintained. For 
example, recently, due to several positive factors that have dramatically increased 
security throughout Iraq, such as “the Surge,” Iraqis have seen electricity generation 
increase by 12% between September 2007 and September 2008 (Department of Defense 
2008).  However, until the government is able to increase levels to meet a sustained 
demand, Iraqis are making up the difference by utilizing private reciprocating engine 
generators.  Almost half of Iraqis in a DoD report stated that they utilize a private 
generator to make up the supply gap (Cordesman 2007).  The January 2008 SIGIR 
report estimated the actual number of generators providing this power at 30,000—
50,000, generating 2000 to 4500 MW of power (Bowen 2008).  This presents a problem 
for two reasons: small diesel generators are less efficient than larger generating units are, 
and they tap into the fuel market and reduce the availability of fuel for other uses.  This 
diversion of fuel puts an additional burden on the logistical system as larger quantities of 
fuel are moved to dispersed points of demand.  Further, it has the potential to impact 
security resources, as assets must be utilized to secure fuel flowing into residential areas. 
A similar story has unfolded in Afghanistan.  The main difference is that 
Afghanistan had very little infrastructure remaining, or in place, to begin with.  Both 
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countries present situations in which electrical demands need to be met in order to 
improve the morale of the citizenry, and to promote economic development.   
B. DECENTRALIZATION 
1. Iraq’s Current Network Architecture 
Modern national electrical grids, such as the one utilized in the United States, 
typically consist of large-scale generation plants fueled by hydrocarbon-based fuel such 
as coal, natural gas, or fuel oil.  A smaller number of electric plants are fueled by non-
hydrocarbon means such as: nuclear fission, hydroelectric power, and a small but 
growing percentage of “renewable” sources including geothermal, wind and solar.  
Figure 3 provides a basic overview of the pathway electricity takes from generation to 
final distribution.  
 
 
Figure 3: Typical Large-scale U.S. Generation and Distribution System (From:  
DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Website, 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/) 
The four predominant generation plant types in Iraq are hydroelectric, 
geothermal, gas turbine and diesel (Bowen 2008).  Iraq’s electricity infrastructure is 
comprised of the same basic components as the national grid in the United States, with 
the exception that its transmission lines are principally 400 and 132 kilovolts (see Figure 




Generation facilities produce the power, while transmission stations and lines 
move that electrical power from the power stations to distribution networks.  The 
distribution network moves power to the end users, such as residential units, city and 
military facilities.   
 
Figure 4: Iraq Electrical Grid as of 2006 (From:  IEEE Spectrum Online 
Article, "Re-engineering Iraq,” Feb. 2006.) 
In the United States, a complex communications and control system is in place to 
ensure the efficient operation of the entire network.  As of 2007, an Iraqi national 
communications and control system was being designed in order to monitor system 
performance and ensure equitable distribution of electricity (Government Accountability 
Office 2007).  Once in place, this type of national network provides understood 
efficiencies in terms of electricity generation, distribution and costs.  However, the 
concept relies on a large, centralized, and easily targeted network comprised of 
generation and transfer nodes connected by thousands of miles of electrical line (arcs, in 
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networking parlance).  Unfortunately, the scope of the deterioration of the system in 
Iraq, as well as government corruption, and the lack of coordination between the 
Ministries of Oil and Electricity, has resulted in massive economic and structural 
problems.   
The construction costs for building the components of a national system are high.  
For example, an Army Corps of Engineers refurbishment project at the Mussayib Gas 
Generation Power Plant station, roughly 40 miles south of Baghdad, cost $26.8 million.  
This plant produces approximately 400 MW of electricity, which is enough to power 
36,000 Iraqi homes (Langer 2008).  That translates to $67,000 per MW in capital 
reconstruction costs.  Another project, building two gas-combustion towers at a 
substation in the northern Iraqi province of Kirkuk, which is projected to generate 325 
MW when completed, is estimated to cost $536,000 per MW in FY2005 dollars (USAID 
2005).  By comparison, in the United States, a traditional coal fired power plant’s capital 
costs average approximately $2.0 to $3.2 million per MW (Puckett 2008).  When 
compared to the $/MW price in the United States, it would appear that these two 
examples of plant construction/enhancements are reasonable.  However, the uncertain 
security environment in Iraq significantly complicates the calculation of reconstruction 
costs. 
Several U.S. government reports cite specific examples of the “hidden” costs 
associated with rebuilding Iraq’s large-scale generation and distribution network in such 
a dynamic security environment.  A 2005 USAID report, documents the repair of a 205 
km (127.4 miles), 400 KV transmission line and towers along the Khor Al Zubayer - 
Nassiriyah corridor, which had been severely damaged by hostile actors.  The price tag 
for the ten-month long project was $17.7 million (USAID 2005).  A 2007 Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report on the reconstruction of Iraq’s oil and electricity 
sectors cites a U.S. government estimate that Iraq is losing approximately $4.1 billion 
per year in possible fuel revenues due to inefficient energy production practices (GAO 
2007).  Finally, in 2008, the GAO, referring to data from the Department of Defense 
(DoD), stated that despite significant security gains, electricity production is still far 
below goals due to fuel shortages, fuel and electricity interdictions, infrastructure 
 7
damage, and the shear task of rebuilding both sectors after years of damage and neglect 
(GAO 2008).  The United State’s total economic burden, as of 2008, reached roughly 
7.4 billion in reconstruction aid for both interdependent sectors (GAO 2008).   
2. The Cost of Oil 
Iraq generates approximately 94% of its electricity from oil (EIA 2004).  
Therefore, under its current structure, Iraq’s electricity sector cannot shed the burdens of 
its reliance on the oil sector.  Therefore, the costs of electricity are inextricably linked to 
the costs of oil.  These are not just economic costs, but also political, social and security.  
For example, there are costs manifested in the political rivalry between Kurds and the 
majority Arab government as they struggle to develop an agreement in oil revenue 
sharing.  The societal costs in Iraq take the form of decreased quality of life and 
productivity as the nation is subject to limited hours of electricity per day and rolling 
blackouts.  Finally, U.S., Iraqi and coalition forces have incurred economic and human 
costs in the effort to move crude oil and processed fuels across the country in easily 
targeted convoys.   
a. Current Military Energy Considerations  
The war in Iraq has caused U.S. commanders to think of, and call for, 
new ways to power forward operating bases and to manage fuel logistics. 
On July 25, 2006, Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer submitted 
a “Priority 1” request for a “self-sustainable energy solution” for his area of 
responsibility in western Iraq.  He specifically requested “solar panels and wind 
turbines” (Clayton 2006, 01).  The rationale, according to the memo, was that without 
alternative sources of power, United States military forces would “remain unnecessarily 
exposed” and would “continue to accrue preventable….serious and grave casualties” 
(Zilmer 2006).  In the one-year period after Maj. Gen. Zilmer’s memo was submitted, 
total attacks in the country reached a sustained level of roughly 150 per day (GAO 
2008).  Transporting and protecting oil, refined fuel products, and oil and electrical 
infrastructure consumes coalition resources.  Maj. Gen. Zilmer’s memo warns, “Without 
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this solution, personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate.  Continued 
casualty accumulation exhibits potential to jeopardize mission success” (Zilmer 2006). 
Further data on the impact of current energy production on military 
operations is found in academic research.  In 2004, Amory Lovins, founder of the Rocky 
Mountain Institute (RMI), an energy research and policy institute, found that 
approximately 70% of the gross tonnage moved when the U.S. Army deploys is 
dedicated to fuel.  According to RMI, in 2004, $0.2 billion was spent on fuel every year, 
and $3.2 billion was spent on maintaining the personnel to move it (Lovins, Amory B. 
and E. Kyle Datta 2005).  In 2007, following three years of fuel price increases, the 
Army’s fuel costs alone were over $2 billion (Defense Energy Support Center 2007).  
“Fuel logistics, as much as anything, prevents America’s most lethally effective forces 
from being rapidly deployable and its most rapidly deployable forces from assuredly 
winning”  (Lovins and Datta 2005). 
Both Maj. Gen. Zilmer and Dr. Lovins were writing about how the 
burdens of military related energy production and logistics negatively affect the mission.  
These burdens are magnified when, as in Iraq, logistical fuel loads are increased 
significantly in order to shore up the country’s oil and electrical infrastructure as it 
struggles to meet a portion of Iraq’s consumer demand.  In an interview with Mark 
Clayton, Lovins summed up the issue in a 2006 Christian Science Monitor article, “At 
the tip of the spear is where the need to avoid the cost of fuel logistics is most acute.  If 
you don’t need divisions of people hauling fuel, you can realign your force structure to 
be more effective as well as less vulnerable.”  
3. A Tactical Argument for Diversification and Decentralization 
The Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command and U.S. Special 
Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures joint publication, titled “Multi-
Service Concept for Irregular Warfare” (MSCIW), asserts that emphasizing economic 
development reduces “the root causes of popular discontent and helps to prevent further 
conflict” (United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command and U.S. Special 
Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures 2006).  Iraq has provided a 
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fruitful test bed for all aspects of modern warfare.  Taking from lessons learned, several 
recent publications by both military and civil agencies have written about the ways in 
which the new global extremist threat is to be countered.  The MSCIW asserts that 
finding expedient ways to create meaningful, long-term employment opportunities, and 
to reconstruct and/or bolster basic service infrastructure work to temper extremist’s 
movements and influence within impoverished communities.   
Funding small-scale (two megawatts and smaller) electric generation works 
projects offers an opportunity to create local jobs, rebuild infrastructure and reestablish 
economic and social viability.  Entrepreneurial Iraqi’s have already done this with the 
emergence of a local energy market, populated by individuals who have purchased small 
diesel reciprocating engine generators and sell energy to the community (Bowen 2008).  
However, as previously noted, this type of small-scale production has served to create a 
large-scale problem by increasing demand of diesel fuel.  An alternative would be to 
invest in other types of distributed generation (DG) systems that would bring regulated 
and more efficient energy on-line, decrease the demand for diesel fuel, provide 
employment opportunities, and help bridge the supply vs. demand deficit.  DG systems 
could be made up of small, highly efficient microturbines; solar photovoltaic panels that 
would require no fuel and little maintenance; small-scale wind turbines that require no 
fuel inputs; or even small-scale diesel generators that can be operated more efficiently 
and produce more energy than small domestic generators.   There is no single 
technology solution for this problem.  However, a diverse energy portfolio would 
produce electricity efficiently, reliably, reduce the logistical burden and footprint, and 
provide opportunities for job creation in the fields of maintenance and security.   
MSCIW points out that once a reconstruction effort begins, it should be followed 
through to the end (United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command and 
U.S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures 2006).  For 
example, the U.S. led coalition and the host government risk losing credibility when grid 
enhancement/reconstruction projects become burdened with frequent delays or are 
abandoned once hostilities appear to cease.  Investing in small-scale, distributed 
generation systems would allow for incremental approaches to rebuilding the grid.  If 
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pauses in rebuilding were required, it would be less noteworthy then stopping mid-
stream in constructing a multi-billion dollar generation plant. 
4. Closing the Delta 
Small-scale distributed generation technologies hold the possibility of providing 
a cost effective, logistical and tactical solution to closing the electrical generation gap in 
Iraq, and other places where the West has a responsibility for rebuilding or advancing 
civil societies.   In Iraq, there continues to be a large delta between the amount of 
electricity that is produced, transmitted and distributed, compared to the demand.  Iraqi 
citizens, who desire the same conveniences that any other modern society benefits from, 
are attempting to meet this demand by bringing in small, inefficient generators, or 
stealing power from existing power lines.  These actions are counterproductive and 
produce wide-ranging negative effects on government attempts to rebuild the grid, and 
the military operations that attempt to bring security to the effort.  Despite security 
gains, Iraqis quite often have to tolerate intermittent service or no electricity at all.  The 
effect of decentralizing a portion of the electrical supply system is to increase the 
amount of work insurgents and other bad actors have to commit to, while decreasing the 
impact on electricity consumers.  DG technologies that reduce fuel logistics and security 
burdens may be able to close the power generation delta and help the country rebuild 




II. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND MICROGRIDS 
A. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION DEFINED  
Distributed generation (DG) is the production of electricity from a modular, 
small-scale generator located close to the load, or point of demand (Akhil 2007).  
Another term, distributed generation resource, or DGR, is used when speaking of the 
technologies that are used to generate electricity.  Both terms are used in this paper.  
Specifically, DGR can include reciprocating engines, small-scale hydroelectric, 
photovoltaic (PV) systems, wind turbines, microturbines, and fuel cells.  All of these 
technologies can be up-and down-scaled to fit the needs of the community or individuals 
served.   
For the purpose of this paper, “small-scale” refers to generation systems that 
produce two megawatts and less.  Generation capacities greater than two megawatts are 
referred to as “large-scale.”  The analytical focus in this is on four specific types of 
small-scale DG technologies:   
1.  Microturbines, are small combustion engines, which utilize the same basic 
design of an aircraft auxiliary power unit. 
2.  Reciprocating engines, which is the same ubiquitous internal combustion 
technology that is used to power automobiles.  Only engines that are powered by 
diesel fuel are considered in this research. 
3.  Photovoltaic panels (PV) which capture ambient photons from the sun, strip 
the electrons out, and produce electricity. 
4.  Small-scale wind turbines, which convert the kinetic energy of the wind 
blowing over their blades into electrical energy. 
Fuel cells and hydroelectric power are not considered in this thesis.  At this time, 




application in consideration.  Small-scale hydroelectric is a specialized technology, and 
while possible in areas where water resources exist, are probably not best suited for a 
desert region such as Iraq.   




Figure 5: Capstone Microturbines (Source:  Capstone Turbine Coorperation) 
Microturbines (Figure 5) are small combustion turbine engines.  Current models 
produce between 25kW and 500kW of power.  Microturbine technology was originally 
created to serve as auxiliary power units on aircraft and large trucks (California Energy 
Commission 2002).  The basic components of a microturbine are the compressor, 
combustor, turbine section, alternator, recuperator and the generator (U.S. Department 
of Energy, Distributed Energy Program 2006).  The majority of microturbines are of 
single-stage, radial flow design.  There are several variations in the construction; 
however, these details are not an important aspect of this research. 
There are two primary ways of classifying microturbines: simple cycle (also 
called un-recuperated), and recuperated.  Recuperated systems recover the heat from the 
exhaust gas to boost the combustion temperature and increase the overall efficiency.  
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Simple cycle systems are of simpler design, do not recapture this heat energy, and are 
thus less efficient.  An offset to this lower efficiency is lower capital costs. 
An attractive aspect of microturbine systems is that they have a small number of 
moving parts and thus require less maintenance.  They also have a small special 
footprint relative to the amount of electricity they produce.  Compared to other types of 
combustion DGs, microturbines produce electricity more efficiently, with reduced 
emissions, reduced electricity costs, and are able to utilize a wide range of fuels.  While 
not a focus of this research, the waste heat can be captured and reused to both boost the 
efficiencies of the combustion, and provide energy for water and space heating (U.S. 
Department of Energy, Distributed Energy Program 2006).   
The drawbacks of a microturbine system include high unit costs, fuel 
requirements, high decibel sound, requirements for security, and a loss of efficiency at 
higher ambient temperatures and altitudes, both of which are considerations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (California Energy Commission 2002).   
2. Reciprocating Engines  
 
Figure 6: Caterpillar Model 3406C 300kW Reciprocating Diesel Generator 
(Source:  Caterpillar) 
DG reciprocating engines (Figure 6) are based on the same technology that can 
be found in an average car or small residential generator.  This research only looks at 
reciprocating engines that consume diesel fuel due to the ease of acquiring both the 
technology and the fuel worldwide.  Reciprocating engines are the most common and 
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technologically mature DGR.  The production size of a reciprocating engine generator 
ranges from less than a 1000 watts, such as a small recreational back-up generator, to 
utility scale units of five megawatts (California Energy Commission 2002).  
Reciprocating engines primarily run on petroleum products, such as gasoline, and diesel, 
although some engines can burn natural gas or diesel derived from organic wastes 
(biodiesel). 
Operation is relatively simple, in that a fuel is introduced into a piston chamber 
where it is combusted, transforming chemical energy into mechanical energy by driving 
the piston and transferring that energy to a shaft system.   
Attributes that make reciprocating engines attractive in Iraq include that they are 
common and widely available, relatively cheap, are highly reliable, have good 
efficiencies, and have quick start-up times. 
Negative attributes of reciprocating engines are that they are noisy, produce high 
levels of pollutants, require frequent maintenance, and have the same security 
requirements as a microturbine.  Their use also imposes a high logistical burden to keep 
pace with fuel requirements. 
3. Photovoltaic Systems 
 
Figure 7: Photovoltaic panels 
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Photovoltaic (PV) systems (Figure 7) directly convert the photons from sunlight 
into electricity.  The device that is used to capture and convert this energy is called a 
solar cell.  The most common solar cell is known as a silicon (Si) PV cell (Gibilisco 
2007).  Other materials used in manufacturing PV cells include gallium arsenide (GaAs), 
copper indium gallium deselenide (CIGS), amorphous silica (a-Si), and cadmium 
telluride (CdTe).  New technologies and processes continue to emerge on the market 
every year.  CIGS, a-Si and CdTe technologies represent a burgeoning industry in thin-
film solar panels, foils and pliable plastics.  Many are in production now, and offer 
several potential advantages such as lighter weights, cheaper production costs, cheaper 
capital and installation costs, lower profiles, moldable (can be made into roofing 
materials, siding, canopies, etc.), and lower maintenance.  There are attributes of these 
systems that detract from their prospective benefits.  For example, the technologies are 
still new to the market, and typically have half the efficiency of traditional Si panels.  
However, the loss in efficiency is offset by the projected cheaper price.  Additionally, as 
investments in research have increased, so have the efficiencies of both thin film and 
traditional PV systems. 
The structure of a basic Si PV panel is comprised of two types of silicon, called 
P and N types.  These two types come together in the center of the panel at the P-N 
junction, or diode.  The top of the panel is made of a clear glass that both protects the 
silicon, and allows light energy to enter and directly strike the diode.  A metal ribbing 
connected by tiny wires lies on top of the two silicon wafers, and serves as the positive 
electrode.  A metal base is placed in contact with the N-type silicon and serves as the 
negative electrode substrate (Gibilisco 2007).   
Operation of a solar panel is relatively simple.  When radiant energy from the 
sun hits the N-layer, an electron is knocked free, but stays in the layer.  Similarly, when 
a photon hits the P-layer, an electron is knocked free and it crosses over to the N-layer.  
Electrons accumulate in the N-layer until, at a saturation point, the electrons flow onto, 
and down the wiring system, where they enter a DC circuit (Aldous, Yewdall, and and 
Ley 2007).  Power can then be utilized in a DC form, which is more efficient, or it can  
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be inverted to AC power, which is more useful due to the configuration of modern 
electrical systems and appliances.  The power is used directly, stored in a battery system, 
or fed back into an electrical grid. 
PV systems offer several benefits.  The fuel, sunlight, is renewable and requires 
no logistics support, save occasional system replacement parts.  The panels are solid 
state, rugged, require very little maintenance, and can last for decades with only slight 
degradation in efficiency.  PV panels are useable in a stand-alone system, or easily 
integrated into a network.  PV system electrical capacity can be as small as watts, for 
small applications, or mega-watts on a utility scale (Kreith and Goswami 200723-2).  As 
noted, newer materials can be integrated into roofs, walls, windows, and almost any 
other application imaginable.  They are ideally suited for regions with large amounts of 
direct sunlight, such as the American southwest, or the desert regions of Iraq.  They can 
be laid flat on a roof to conceal their existence, and they can be connected in series to 
increase generating capacity.  PV systems emit no emissions at the point of use. 
PV has several detractors as well.  For example, the reliance on sunlight means 
that production is limited to daylight.  It is affected by degraded environment conditions, 
such as cloudy days, or sand storms.  Hail and wind can also interfere with, or even 
destroy panels.  If storage is desired, batteries must be used, and they add costs and 
potential dangers to a system.  Panels are portable and worth money, and therefore may 
become targets for theft.  While prices have been reduced in recent years, system up-
front costs are still considerably higher that reciprocating engines.  However, there are 
reduced maintenance costs and no fuel costs.  This thesis analyzes how they compare in 
a military theater environment.   
 17
4. Wind Turbine Systems 
 
Figure 8: Bergey Skystream Model BWC EXCEL 10 kW Wind Turbine 
(Source:  Bergey Windpower) 
Wind turbines (Figure 8) harvest kinetic energy from the wind.  With that 
energy, they generate electricity by capitalizing on the wind flow creating lift over the 
turbine blades, much like a propeller driven aircraft (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 2006).  Wind turbines have 
become a primary alternative energy solution in many areas of the world, including 
Europe and the U.S.   
The basic structure of a wind turbine is comprised of a blade system attached to a 
generator, or set of generators, and mounted on a tower.  Gears are required in most 
common types of generators in order to transform the low rotor speeds to those that are 
required to generate electricity.  There is roughly a 2% efficiency loss for every stage of 
gears (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
2006).  Generators are used singularly, or tied to an array of turbines.  In other words, 
systems can produce as little as a few watts, up to a utility sized capacity that is limited 
only to the physical space available to put up towers.  The large utility sized groupings 
of wind turbines are called farms (California Energy Commission 2002).   
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Wind energy offers several advantages.  For example, generation is relatively 
cheap, individual units have a small footprint, and the decentralized nature of a DG wind 
turbine means that if a tower is knocked off-line, the impact is localized.  In addition, 
there is no fuel requirement, which results in zero emissions and small logistical 
footprint.  Finally, small residential units can be deployed and set up quickly (California 
Energy Commission 2002). 
Negative aspects of wind energy include that electricity production is completely 
dependent on whether or not the wind is blowing.  Thus, site selection is very important, 
and it may not correspond with local demand for power.  Another aspect of this problem 
is that the amount of electricity produced varies, depending on wind speed.  Finally, the 
tower and blade systems present a relatively soft target for someone looking to make an 
impact on power production.  Finally, many people may have a problem with the 
esthetics of the system. 
C. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION PROS AND CONS 
Potential advantages of distributed generation include: 
1. A reduction of required infrastructure, such as transmission lines and 
transfer stations.  This can result in a significant decrease in construction 
and maintenance costs when compared to large, complicated power 
generation plants.   
2. The decentralization of electrical generation would create more jobs 
throughout a wide geographic area.  The types of jobs created would 
include maintenance and security positions located within the 
communities where the electricity is produced.  This would produce 
locally created wealth, personal skill development and facilitate the 
notion of civil society and responsibility as individuals in a community 
are given a stake in the security and success of the station. 
3. Reduce pollution, both in terms of emissions at the generation source, 
and in the transportation of liquid or gasified fuel replenishment.   
4. DG provides for the decentralization of electricity production.  This 
reduces the amount of long distance infrastructure that is part of 
traditional large-scale generation plants, such as those currently being 
invested in Iraq now.  Reduced infrastructure and decentralization 
presents a smaller target profile and thus greater security.  It also reduces 
efficiency losses during long distance transmission. 
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5. In the case of Iraq, moderating the country’s reliance on oil for domestic 
use by shedding some of the generation load to DG technologies, 
especially those that do not use fossil fuels, has the potential to reduce 
political and social conflict over fossil fuel use.  Relying almost entirely 
on fossil fuels to create electricity in a region with plentiful sun and wind 
resources is arguably a misuse of a valuable export commodity.   
6. Small DG systems have the potential to be rapidly deployed to areas of 
high demand, and offer a reliable step up approach to bridging an 
electrical generation gap.   
7. DG systems can be installed to complement each other.  For example, PV 
can be installed in combination with a wind turbine to generate electricity 
day and night.  Or, a PV system can be installed with a battery backup 
that would pick up a partial load at night, and be recharged during the 
day. 
Drawbacks of distributed generation include: 
1. May lose on economy of scale savings provided by large centralized 
plants.  In addition, large hydrocarbon burning plants are a known and 
well-understood generation platform.  They are also well engineered in 
many respects, and there is a lot of money in contracts made available by 
governments that benefit international, national and local businesses. 
2. Decentralizing maintenance and security responsibilities to a local area, 
perhaps even directly to the consumer, can have unexpected downsides.  
It may be difficult to find and/or train people to maintain and secure 
equipment. 
3. The logistics of deploying thousands of units may be a significant 
challenge.  While the logistical footprint is smaller than the oil/electricity 
sectors, there is still an initial burden in deploying both the DG unit and 
the accompanying wiring, storage and mounting equipment, batteries, 
charge controllers, DC-AC inverters, etc.   
4. The implications of doing a large-scale tie-in of DGs into the existing 
electrical network and infrastructure in a place like Iraq are unknown to 
this author. 
5. While new DG technologies, such as thin film PV, have the potential to 
have competitive $/kW rates, the technologies are often new and 
relatively unproven.  Traditional DG technology prices are coming down, 




competitiveness of DG to traditional large-scale generation in a unique 
and hostile environment, such as in Iraq, is unknown.  Analysis of this 
issue is the focus of this thesis. 
6. All machines require certain conditions for efficient and effective 
operation.  The physical and atmospheric conditions in which a DGR is 
operated have an effect on generation efficiency.  For example, solar 
panels lose efficiency as temperature increases.  Wind turbine efficiencies 
are dependent on specific winds speeds, as designed by the manufacturer.  
Engines work less efficiently at higher altitudes due to decreased oxygen 
levels.  All DGRs have proper and improper, site installation locations.  It 
is important to do a complete site survey to properly design a DG system 
that generates electricity efficiently and reliably.  This may result in 
increased system prices.   
D. MICROGRID DEFINED 
A microgrid, or minigrid, is the interconnected structure that is formed when 
several DGRs are linked together.  A microgrid is typically comprised of co-located 
distributed generation technologies, energy storage equipment, and end-use loads.  
Microgrids have a broad application of use.  General examples range from rural 
electrification, residential/community power networks, commercial, municipal, hospital, 
campus, and military base power grids (Ye 2005).  China Lake Naval Air Weapons 
Station serves as a specific example of an operational microgrid.  Following the 
experience of the impact of a commercial utility failure on strategic operations at China 
Lake, the United States Navy began the process of installing DG technologies on the 
base in order to ensure power to critical loads.  The system currently includes several 
small-scale solar installations, with plans for a large-scale array of PV panels that can 
handle all of the base’s critical load demands whenever the utility company has 
problems delivering supply. 
The importance of the concept of a microgrid to this research is that it is the 
bridge that would tie any DGRs deployed in, say an Iraqi neighborhood, to the greater 
National grid, or macrogrid.  In a village that was not near national grid infrastructure, a 
microgrid, such as that depicted in Figure 9, would form the basis for the way in which 
that village distributes the DG generated power throughout the village.  The goal of this 
paper is not to analyze the relationship between DGRs, microgrids and macrogrids.  It is 
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to begin to analyze and quantify the fully burdened costs of DG in post-war 
reconstruction.  However, without understanding microgrids, one cannot know how DG 
would be able to help solve the greater problem. 
 
Figure 9: Microgrid Example (Source:  Sandia National Labs White Paper, 
"Microgrid Characterization in the United States,” p. 15) 
 
Sandia National Labs defines three classifications of microgrids, Simple, Master 
Control, and Peer-to-Peer.  The characteristics of each are summarized in Figure 10 
(EPS = electric power system):  
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Figure 10: Microgrid Characteristics (From:  Sandia National Labs Report, 
“Characterization of Microgrids,” 2005. 
 
A microgrid system should meet the specific and unique needs of a site.  If those 
needs are critical, i.e., power has to be available with little or no interruption, such as at 
a hospital, then a microgrid is tailor designed to handle those circumstances.  In order to 
create a near seamless transition from area EPS to local EPS, either a static transfer 
switch in conjunction with a battery storage system, or a DG system operating in parallel 
with the area EPS must be installed  (Friedman and Stevens 2005).  In either case, non-
critical loads are dropped, unless the system is designed to provide enough generation 
capacity to maintain them.  The process of disconnecting from an area grid, or utility 
provider, in order to supply electricity only via DG systems is called islanding (Ye 
2005).   Islanding can present several technical complications in terms of how the 
microgrid interacts with the macrogrid; however, these complications are not a concern 
of this paper, and are not addressed.   
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Microgrids operate in three specific modes, as defined by Sandia National Labs: 
• Mode 1 is called Partial Baseload, and is a condition in which DGRs 
provide baseload power to a portion of a sites loads, but rely on an area 
EPS to supply supplemental and backup power.   
• Mode 2 is a Full Baseload, and is a situation in which distributed 
generators provide power to all the loads of a site, and the area EPS 
provides a backup system.   
• Mode 3 is referred to as a Backup/Peaking mode.  This is when an area 
EPS provides power to all the loads at a site.  It relies on DG resources to 
provide backup and peak load resources (Friedman and Stevens 2005).   
It is not the purpose of this research to decide what class microgrid should be 
used, and under what mode.  Rather it is our purpose to begin to quantify the fully 
burdened cost of electricity production in a Phase IV military stabilization operation, as 
embodied by the current situation in Iraq.  We believe that microgrids powered by DGR 
provide an option for expanding electrical production through modularity and increased 
security and reliability. 
Some coalition forces responsible for rebuilding the grid in Iraq have already 
recognized this and are currently installing microgrids.  They refer to the concept as 
“micro-generation.”  Projects are based on 200-400 kW sized reciprocating engine 
generators, formed around a neighborhood/business coop system (Coalition Force Iraq 
Reconstruction Unit 2007).  According to 2007 briefs acquired through sources in Iraq, 
the actual installation of the system is relatively easy, but the authors acknowledge that 
reciprocating engines create a problem due to the fuel requirement (Coalition Force Iraq 
Reconstruction Unit 2007).  This is where the question of what type of DGR makes 
sense in post-war reconstruction becomes relevant.  The following analysis attempts to 
determine whether reciprocating engines, microturbines, PV and/or solar, either 
singularly, or in combination make economic sense when utilized for electrical grid 
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III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this research is to quantify the fully burdened cost of electricity 
generation in post-war reconstruction using various life-cycle cost estimates.  Iraq was 
chosen as the test case for this endeavor.  All cost data is normalized to annual dollar per 
kilowatt ($/kW).  This was done to facilitate comparative analysis between four types of 
deployable distributed generation technologies and a sample of the large-scale 
generation that was invested in Iraq during the height of the war. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
During the course of this research, very little data on distributed generation 
technology in Iraq was discovered.  Therefore, all of the capital and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) cost data used in this research is based on installation in the United 
States.  In order to account for differences in regional installation (e.g., Iowa vs. 
Baghdad), a security multiplier was developed based on previous research by 
Brookhaven National Laboratory in a publication titled, “Reference Guide for Hazard 
Analysis in PV Facilities.”  This multiplier is discussed in detail later.   
Emphasis was placed on developing a detailed data set on four types of DG that 
might feasibly be deployed to a potentially hostile region.  Specific data of interest for 
each of these DGs includes technology type, average generation capacity in kilowatts 
(kW), capital costs (initial equipment plus installation costs), operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs, fuel costs, storage costs, security costs, type of fuel and fuel consumption.   
There are several economic unknowns when conducting academic analysis 
remotely from the geographic area of interest.  For example, O&M costs in this research 
are based on studies citing the economic realities in the United States.  These costs are 
going to be different than the costs in another region in the world due to the difference in 
labor, logistics, parts availability and fuel costs, just to name a few.  When and if this 
information becomes available, the database, and the research, can be updated.  Until 
then, this research is offered as a reasonable attempt to calculate those costs.  Because of 
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the lack of data, this research does not actively account for economic factors such as tax 
breaks, contract premiums, and exact logistical costs for deployment in a hostile 
environment. 
As noted in Chapter II, meteorological conditions affect the operation and 
efficiency of all equipment exposed to the elements.  During a sand storm, to cite an 
extreme example, engine intakes may become clogged, PV cells may take in less 
sunlight, and wind turbine gears may become fouled.  In a more mundane example, 
some areas of the world receive more wind and/or sunlight than others, thus affecting 
electrical production with renewable technologies.  This research does not account for 
exact conditions that may influence each system. 
Complete network architecture, often referred to as balance of system (BOS), is 
not considered in this research.  The only exception to this is that the $/kW figure used 
for battery storage is taken from a Sandia National Labs report that included BOS in its 
calculations (Schoenung and Hassenzahl 2007).  Recommended BOS items for 
integration in further work are inverters, converters, specific storage requirements, and 
connection technologies (wiring). 
In this analysis, a system’s physical life was used to determine the period of time 
over which the benefits between the various alternatives were expected to accrue.  The 
estimated average number of years that each generation system could be physically used 
before replacement was researched.  These numbers were found in various publications 
and technical information websites, such as on the National Renewable Energy Lab’s 
site, www.nrel.gov.  When estimates varied, the lesser value was used.  Physical life 
spanned from around five years before a major overall was required in large-scale 
natural gas turbines, to approximately 30 years in a PV panel before it begins to lose a 
consequential amount of efficiency.  The system life number was used to divide the total 
costs for each system.  This number was then added to the other cost variables which 
were already given in annual $/kW figures. 
The number of hours a system would be used in a given day was defined by the 
author.  The actual number of hours a DG would be used depends on several variables.  
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For example, whether the system is stand-alone or part of a microgrid, and, if it is part of 
a microgrid, whether or not the microgrid is tied into the macrogrid.  This would 
determine if the DG is used only for power shaving at times of peak demand, or if the 
system was a primary source of power.  Environmental factors provide another large 
operational variable.  Where, when and for how long the wind blows and the sun shines 
has an obvious impact on wind and PV DG use.  For the purpose of this research, it was 
assumed that all systems were stand-alone, and thus did not rely on power from a 
macrogrid.  Diesel, microturbine, and wind turbine generators were assumed to operate 
for 20 hours a day.  PV was assumed at 10 hours.  The large-scale generators were 
specified to operate for 21.92 hours a day.  This was based on an EPA report from which 
cost data was gathered.  The costs data was based on an 8000 hour a year schedule.   
All of the systems evaluated were done so with a derived annual $/kW value, 
thus enabling a normalized comparison of one year for systems with significantly 
different physical lives.   
One of the reasons for researching the use of distributed generation systems in 
post-war reconstruction was the desire to think of a way to produce electricity on a 
broad scale, but decentralized in order to reduce the target appeal for insurgents, 
opposition militias and criminals.  DG technologies, such as the four investigated in this 
research, offer these benefits in a package that takes up a relatively small amount of 
physical space.  Reciprocating diesel engines, microturbines, solar PV panels and small-
scale wind turbines all have a relatively small footprint and are presumably reasonably 
easy to deploy.  This is one reason why small diesel generators have been used to make 
up the large-scale generation deficit by Iraqi civilians.   
In addition to space, and assuming manufacturers can keep up with demand, DG 
technologies offer the potential for quick deployment on a broad scale as opposed to the 
long period of time it takes to design and construct a complex large-scale electric plant. 
The price tag for rebuilding power plants presents what is arguably the largest 
constraint to the overall reconstruction effort.  It is hoped that this research helps to cast 
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some light on the options that decision makers and planners have at their disposal when 
developing and rebuilding electrical networks in post-war regions. 
C. LIST OF PROBLEM ALTERNATIVES 
As noted, current electrical production in Iraq is done using large-scale oil, 
natural gas, and hydroelectric projects.  These systems currently produce, on average, 
half of the supply the grid system demands.  Several alternatives could decrease the 
supply deficit.   
1.   Existing Methods 
The first would be to build upon the status quo, large-scale technologies.  In a 
stable political, social and military environment, this may very well be the appropriate 
answer.  Large-scale production can offer economy- and production-of-scale benefits.  
They offer concentrated logistics streams for both parts and fuel.  Finally, they provide 
well-known and understood technological and capacity benefits.  In Iraq, these types of 
power plants are being, upgraded, retrofitted, expanded, and duplicated.  However, 
regions engaged in postwar reconstruction often do not have the luxury of stability to 
rely on when making infrastructure improvements, so many of these benefits, as proven 
by the example in Iraq, cannot be fully realized.  During the height of the war in Iraq, 
the country’s large-scale generation systems and the grid that connected it were easy 
targets.  As previously noted, this is one of the prime causes for the slow and inadequate 
pace of electric infrastructure rebuilding.  A small sample of Iraqi large-scale natural gas 
turbine power plant data is used in order to compare to DG alternatives. 
2.   Alternatives 
Another generation option is to invest in and deploy distributed generation 
technologies.  As discussed, there are several types of DG systems available today.  For 
the purpose of this research, PV, wind, microturbines, and diesel-powered reciprocating 
engine generators have been chosen because they offer prospective ease of deployment 
and a relatively small footprint.  What are unknown are the costs of the broad  
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application of these systems in a war torn region that is suffering from uncertain 
political, social and military environments.  The goal of this research is to determine if 
they do, or do not, make economic sense.   
3.   Infeasible Alternatives 
Some DG technologies are currently just not feasible for use in this application.  
Small-scale hydroelectric projects rely on water resources and do not have a broad 
application in the arid regions currently being discussed.   
Another example of a technology considered currently infeasible for this 
application is concentrated solar power.  Typical concentrated solar power (CSP) 
systems generate electricity by concentrating solar energy, via mirrors, on a liquid 
medium that is super-heated and then harnessed to power steam turbines.  CSP normally 
comes in the form of trough or tower arrays.  These systems are complicated, have a 
large footprint, and are currently engineered for large-scale generation.  Work has been 
done on small-scale CSP systems, but the technology is not common, and thus was not 
considered for this research.   
Finally, fuel cells provide the possibility for efficient, minimal emission 
generation with a small footprint; however, they have high installed costs (Akhil 2007).  
In addition, the technology is still young, complex, and untested in the type of 
environment considered here. 
The exceptions briefly documented here should not preclude these technologies 
from being considered in further work.  However, as of now, they appear to be poor 
choices given the conditions considered in this research. 
D. DATA 
1.   Data Collection 
Data for this research was collected from multiple sources.  The core of the data 
was taken, with permission, from a data set derived by the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) Distributed Energy Resources (DER) team, led by Dr. Chris 
Marnay.  The DER team compiled this data for use in there Distributed Energy 
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Resources Customer Adoption Model (DER-CAM).  DER-CAM is an optimization 
model that uses many of the same variables that are of interest in this research.  As 
described in one of LBNL’s papers on the topic, “DER-CAM models specific sites and 
selects optimal DER systems to install in parallel to the macrogrid, given utility tariffs, 
fuel costs, and equipment performance characteristics.” (Siddiqui 2004)   
The DER-CAM data was evaluated for accuracy and completeness for the four 
types of DG systems being evaluated in this research.  Discrepancies and incomplete 
data points were corrected by researching a multitude of reports published by Sandia 
National Labs, Lawrence Berkley National Labs, and the National Renewable Energy 
Labs (NREL).  Additional data was found in the Handbook of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, edited by Frank Kreith and D. Yogi Goswami (2007).  Finally, in 
some cases open source data was utilized.  Equipment costs for a small sample of diesel 
generators, for example, were taken from an online generator sales site. 
O&M costs are an example of incomplete data that was researched via the 
sources named in the previous paragraph.  In the case of diesel generators, these costs 
had to be calculated based on data from NREL Power Tech Energy Data Book (2006) 
that estimated average diesel generator O&M costs at .013$/kWh.  This number was 
then multiplied times the estimated number of hours a unit would be used in a year, 
resulting in the annual $/kilowatt for this type of system.  Microturbine O&M costs had 
to be calculated similarly using data from the California Distributed Energy Resources 
Guide (2002).   
2.   Data Set Design 
The design of the data set was based on the desire to capture the costs of 
installing and running electrical systems in a post-war environment.  The life-cycle 
costing method was used to evaluate the true costs of these systems as they are 
influenced by fuel logistics and security.  To that end, the primary variables collected 
were initial costs, operation and maintenance costs, fuel costs, energy storage costs, and 
security costs (including a security level multiplier that is discussed in detail later).   
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a.  Initial (Capital) Costs 
Initial diesel generator costs were derived from one of three sources.  
First, cost estimates were obtained directly from the DER-CAM data set, most of which 
was taken from technical specification sheets provided by the manufacturer.  Second, 
estimates were taken directly from open source sales data.  Third, estimates were made 
based on the state of California’s Distributed Energy website, which provides 
generalized costs estimates in FY$02 amounts (California Energy Commission 2002).   
The sample size of microturbines was considerably smaller that diesel 
generators.  The initial costs for three of the units were also taken from the DER-CAM 
data.  The costs for the rest of the units were taken from a low-end FY$09 initial cost 
estimate presented by Resource Dynamics Corporation (Resource Dynamics 
Corporation 2005). 
The photovoltaic panel industry currently has hundreds of manufactures.  
The variations in the technology are both complex and vast.  Collecting cost data from 
an adequate sample of manufacturers would have been difficult.  So, instead of 
accumulating an inaccurate sample of individual products, generalized numbers were 
used for this research.  Data was used from a Lawrence Berkley National Laboratories 
report titled, "Letting the Sun Shine on Solar Costs" (Wiser 2006).  The report provided 
the average installed costs for a range of system generation sizes.  This range was used 
as the basis for the rest of the calculations on PV systems.   
Wind turbine manufacturers, while fewer in number, still make a 
comprehensive range of turbine models.  Collecting actual cost data from manufacturers 
proved to be too inefficient.  Instead, a data set provided by the Canadian Wind Energy 
Association (CWEA) was used.   The CWEA supplied a comprehensive matrix estimate 
of installed costs organized by system generation size (CWEA 2006).  The CWEA 
matrix was used for the rest of the wind turbine calculations.   
Installed/refurbish costs for the two large-scale natural gas turbine 
projects in Iraq were taken directly from USAID Audit Report NO. E-267-05-003 
(USAID 2005).  Their numbers were assumed to be in FY$03. 
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b.  O&M Costs 
Diesel generator O&M costs were derived from information provided by 
NREL’s 2006 “Power Tech Energy Data Book.”  It estimated that average O&M is 
.013$/kWh.  This value was then multiplied by the number of operating hours in a year.  
In this case, it was assumed that a diesel generator would run for 20 hours a day, 
resulting in an annual use of 7300 hours.   
Microturbine O&M costs were taken from the California Distributed 
Energy Resource Guide, which estimated those costs at .016 $/kWh.  This value was 
multiplied times the number of operating hours in a year, which was also assumed 7300 
hours per year. 
PV O&M costs were estimated at .34% of the installed cost.  This 
estimate was taken from a January 2008 paper titled, “SAM (Solar Advisor Model) - 
Sample Commercial System Description.” SAM is a “comprehensive solar technology 
systems analysis model” developed by NREL and Sandia National Labs (National 
Renewable Energy Lab 2008).  This figure does not include balance of system (BOS) 
costs. 
Wind Turbine estimate O&M costs were taken from the Canadian Wind 
Energy Association.  The high-end O&M price was used for the generation capacity 
range, and then divided by the high-end capacity, resulting in a $/kW cost in Canadian 
dollars.  Using an online currency exchange calculator, that number was then normalized 
to the January 2009 U.S. currency rate. 
O&M costs for the two Iraqi facilities were calculated via regression 
analysis based on data from an EPA repo;rt titled, “Technology Characterization: Gas 
Turbines” (EPA, Prepared by: Energy Nexus Group 200218) Their numbers were based 
on 8000 operating hours per year.  Regression was required because the EPA’s analysis 
only included system capacities up to 40,000 kW (see Figure 10).  The Doura Power 
Plant and Kirkuk Substation Turbines produced 320,000 kW and 324,000 kW 
respectively.  Using this method, O&M costs for each facility were calculated at .013 
and .012 $/kW, FY$02, respectively (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: EPA Estimated Gas Turbine Non-Fuel O&M Costs (FY$00) (From:  
EPA Report, p. 18) 
 
 
Figure 12: Est. Large-Scale O&M Costs as a Function of Generation Capacity 
(After:  EPA Report, p. 18) 
Note: No distinction is made in this research between fixed and variable 
O&M costs. 
c.  Fuel Costs 
Diesel generator fuel costs were calculated by multiplying the hourly fuel 
costs (derived from the published/estimated fuel flow rate and the U.S. average cost of 
diesel fuel in January 2009, as published by the U.S. Department of Energy) times the 
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assumed annual, hourly in-service time for each system.  The result was a total annual 
fuel cost.  This fuel cost was then divided by the kW capacity in order to produce an 
average annual $/kW price for each system, in gallons. 
Microturbines were calculated in the same manner as diesel generators; 
however, the fuel type for these systems is natural gas, so some extra unit conversions 
had to be done.  The result was a fuel cost in $/kW, but based on MMBTU’s of natural 
gas, at a January 2009 price, as published by the U.S. Department of Energy. 
Wind turbine and photovoltaic systems do not rely on fuel directly to 
produce electricity. 
Fuel costs of the large-scale generation facilities in Iraq were calculated 
based on current fuel prices as explained above.  The problem initially, however, was 
that is was unknown what the fuel flow rate was for systems of that size.  The EPA 
report used in the O&M calculation above again provided statistics that could be used to 
estimate larger facility fuel costs (see Figure 13).  There appears to be a linear 
relationship between generation capacity and fuel consumption.  The trend analysis 
based on the five data points provided in the EPA report provides evidence of this (see 
Figure 14). 
 
Figure 13:  EPA Estimated Gas Turbine Fuel Flow (Input—MMBTU/hr) (From:  




Figure 14: Large-Scale Gas Turbine Gen. Capacity to Fuel Flow Rate Trend 
Analysis (After:  EPA Report, p. 8) 
d.  Energy Storage Costs 
Energy storage (battery) costs were only applied to wind and PV 
technologies.  The rational was that assuming fuel inputs are not disrupted, and barring 
mechanical failure, fuel consuming DGs remain operational for the assumed hours per 
day.  It should be noted that battery storage could be used with any type of DG 
technology.   
Wind turbines and PV rely on energy inputs from the wind and sun.  
These inputs can vary significantly, depending on meteorological conditions.  One way 
to overcome this variability is to tie the DG system to a micro or macrogrid, thus making 
up for decreased electricity production by the wind and/or PV systems with electricity 
from the grid.  As previously noted, for the purpose of this research, grid tying is not 
assumed.   
A second method to assure power availability is to include battery energy 
storage in the cost of the PV and wind turbine systems. 
 36
The question of which storage technology should be considered for DG 
use in a place such as Iraq was answered in an interview with Georgianne Peek, a 
research scientist and energy storage expert at Sandia National Labs, Albuquerque, NM 
(Peek 2008).  Ms. Peek recommended a gel or, absorbent glass matt (AGM), valve 
regulated lead acid (VRLA) battery.  These types of batteries are ubiquitous, often used 
in automobile, boat and other similar applications.   They are also maintenance free, and 
unlike typical lead-acid batteries, can be oriented in any manner without risk of leaking 
acid, which is a practical benefit in transportation, storage, installation and use.   
Figure 15 shows the annual cost analysis for various types of storage 
systems.  Taken from a 2007 report on storage costs, it shows that there are cheaper 
alternatives to the recommended VRLA lead acid battery.  However, some of the storage 
systems, such as pumped hydro, have site-specific requirements.  VRLA batteries are 
common, proven, portable, easily acquired, and easily replaced.  According to the 
Sandia paper, VRLA lead acid batteries cost approximately $840/kW annually 
(Schoenung and Hassenzahl 2007).  When adjusted for inflation, this type of storage 




Figure 15:  Annual Cost Components for 8-hr Bulk Energy Storage Technologies 
(From:  Sandia National Labs Report SAND2007-4253) 
e.  Security Costs 
There are two levels of security costs used in this research.  First, 
according to the GAO, the Department of Defense estimated that its contractors incurred 
a 14% security premium on the “design/build” of Iraqi electrical projects in 2006 (GAO 
2007).  This was a significantly tighter estimate than the 10-30% estimate the GAO cited 
the DoD in 2004.  To account for the estimate in this research, the 14% figure was 
applied to the entire calculated LCC, and then adjusted to FY$09. 
It is unknown if the 14 % figure captures variations in project site 
locations, fuel logistics, long-term security, and/or actual threat after the design/build of 
the generation facility.  We estimate the cost of these variations by using security threat 
analysis on each of the five types of systems being evaluated in this paper.  The threat 
analysis is based on a paper by Fthenakis and Trammell of Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, titled “Reference Guide for Hazard Analysis in PV Facilities.” The 
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methodology for the analysis is generalized enough to be used to evaluate generation 
technologies other than PV.  The methodological details are described in Section 10 of 
the Reference Guide (Fthenakis and Trammell 2003).   
While this method of security risk analysis is site and project specific, for 
the purpose of this research, and without having first-hand knowledge of security 
constraints in the areas envisioned for the application of the systems being discussed, 
security threat analysis was conducted for generic high- and low-security threat 
possibilities.  The regional model for threat analysis was Iraq, using knowledge and 
assumptions based on security descriptions presented in reports by U.S. government 
agencies, such as USAID, GAO, Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction 
(SIGIR), and the Iraq Study Group.  The dire situation that all of these agencies recorded 
from the period of 2003 to mid-2008 have been documented in Chapter I of this paper.   
Based on this information, low and high-risk security threat matrices 
were completed.  Figure 16 is an example of what a completed matrix looks like, in this 
case, for the high-security threat environment.  The first column lists the targets being 
evaluated:  wind, PV, generator sets (diesel and microturbine), and large-scale gas 
turbines.  Diesel and microturbines have been grouped together for the threat evaluation 
because they have similar security threat profiles.  They both require logistical fuel 
support, have similar footprints in terms of size, noise and heat generation, and they can 
be configured to generate similar production capacities. 
The second column lists the risk element for each target.  The elements 
proposed by Fthenakis and Trammell, and adopted here, are “threat,” “vulnerability,” 
and “consequences.”  As interpreted for this analysis, the term “threat” refers to the 
potential for a given threat type against the system in question.  “Vulnerability” refers to 
the level of damage that a threat can inflict on a system.  “Consequence” refers to the 
impact that the potential damage by a specific threat have on a system. 
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Figure 16: High Security Generalized, Quantitative Security Threat Matrix 
The third through tenth column list specific threat types, beginning with 
“terrorist” and ending in “fuel logistics.”  The original Fthenakis and Trammell matrix 
has been modified.  It included columns for “psychotic,” “disgruntled employee,” and 
“militia,” all of which have been removed.  “Natural disaster” and “fuel logistic” 
categories have been added. 
The body of the matrix is populated with the evaluator’s categorical 
estimate of the threat value for each risk element.  These values can be found in the key 
at the bottom of Figure 16.  In this “high security risk” evaluation, the wind system has 
been deemed to have a category H threat level (circled in blue).  Numerically, this means 
that cell has a value of 10.  Each risk element/threat type cell has been graded in this 
manner.  In another modification from the Brookings guide, a “Threat Indices” column 
has been added after the “threat” columns.  In this column, the categorical values that 
have been populated in the matrix are summed across each respective row.  In a final 
modification to the original matrix concept, a column called “Scaled Security Level 
Multiplier,” has been added.  This column contains only one value for each system type 
(e.g., wind, PV, etc.).  The value is calculated by summing the “threat indices” for each 
system, and then dividing by a scaling factor of 10.  The result is what is being called in 
this paper a Security Threat Multiplier (SLM). 
s 
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The final step in the security threat analysis was to multiply the LCC by 
the SLM.  The thought behind this is that it provides a quantitative method to measure 
the impact various security threats have on electrical infrastructure projects.  It also 
provides for a method of sensitivity analysis, by varying the impact that different 
security threats can have on specific systems.  That is how it is utilized in this paper. 
Note:  Security threat multipliers are derived by the author’s non-expert 
assignment of threat ratings.  While one can argue bias in the ratings, values were 
assigned based on study of real-world threats and their impacts on the systems.  It is 
believed that these values represent a reasonable assessment of generic in-theater 
threats.   
3.   Data Normalization 
The data collected for spanned multiple fiscal years (FY).  Therefore, it was 
necessary to normalize from those published FY dollars to FY$09 in order to provide 
decision makers the most “apples to apples” information. The Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCCA) inflation calculator was used to complete this task 
(http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm). 
The NCCA inflation calculator is a spreadsheet-based tool that requires four 
inputs.  In Figure 17, it can be seen that that the first input is the “Appropriation/Cost 
Element.”  The calculator offers several choices, including “Aviation” and “Fuel 
Procurement” elements.  “Other Procurement, Navy” was used for all of the 
normalization done in this research.   
The second input was the “Base/Input Year.”  This is where the fiscal year that 
the cost data was to be normalized from was entered.  As noted, it varied considerably 
between data inputs.  For example, most of the diesel generator data that Lawrence 
Berkley National Labs (LBNL) collected was from FY$2000.  Whereas, the solar data 
obtained from LBNL was in FY$2004. 
The third input requires the inflation type to be entered.  FY/Constant to 
FY/Constant was chosen for this research.  (This portion of the calculator is optional.  A 
comprehensive table could be generated following input number two.) 
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The fourth and final input required is to enter the “Output/Target Year.”  In all 
cases for this research, cost data was converted to FY$09.   
Following the completion of these steps, the calculator generates the inflation 
factor.  In the example provided in Figure 16, the inflation factor between 1999 and 
2009 is 1.2127.  Once the inflation factor was obtained, it was multiplied by the Life-
Cycle Cost (LCC) value, and the result was then added to the old FY LCC value in order 
to adjust for inflation. 
 
Figure 17: NCCP Inflation Calculator 
Fuel costs were not adjusted for FY09 because those numbers were calculated 
using Department of Energy average estimates in January 2009. 
4.   Life-Cycle Cost  
Life-cycle cost (LCC) is the base value used to analyze differences among the 
systems.  It includes capital and O&M costs, fuel type, fuel consumption and fuel costs, 
storage costs, and security costs.  This data was computed and presented as annual life-
cycle cost in levelized units of $/kW. 
(Note:  The term “levelized” is commonly used in energy research and refers to 
the annulization of phased LCC.  It is similar to annualized present worth (APW).) 
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Levelized (LCC) is made up of the following terms: 
LCC ($/kW) = (initial capital and installation costs (I)  
+ levelized, non-fuel O&M costs (M) 
+ levelized annual fuel costs (E) (diesel gen., microturbine, and large-
scale NGT plants only) 
+ levelized annual storage costs, including BOS (ST) (wind and PV only) 
+ levelized 14% annual security contract costs (EC) ) 
* security level multiplier (SLM) 
Or, 
LCC ($/kW) = (I + M + E + ST + EC) * SLM 
The methods for developing the terms included in this equation have been 
explained in detail earlier in this chapter.   
E. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS 
1.   Deficit Analysis 
The key question that this research seeks to answer is whether the use of 
distributed generation technologies can have a have a positive financial impact in the 
rebuilding of electrical infrastructure in countries recovering from war.  Iraq is the 
primary case study, as it still recovering from a rather large electrical generation deficit.  
In Iraq, in 2008, there is an average annual demand of approximately 8000MW of 
electricity.  The electrical system is currently only able to supply 4500MW.  The 
question is; what is the best way to make up the 3500MW annual supply deficit.   To do 
this, the levelized annual life-cycle cost for each of the evaluated systems was multiplied 
times the production deficit of 3500MW.   
Figure 18 compares the distributed generation systems described earlier to a 
sample average of the large-scale natural gas turbine systems currently being used in 
Iraq.  Three proposed mixed strategies have been calculated.  None of the Figure 18 
generation methods have been calculated with the SLM.    
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The suggested mixed strategies are: 
• One-third each of microturbines, PV and wind turbines (orange column) 
• One-quarter each of diesel generators, microturbines, PV and wind (light 
purple column) 
• One-half large-scale natural gas turbine, and one-sixth each microturbine, 
PV and wind (pink column). 
 
Figure 18: Cost to Make up Annual Iraqi Gen. Capacity Deficit of 3500MW 
using Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies 
If only diesel generation were used (the first, large blue column in the Figure 18), 
it would cost over $5.5 billion to make up the deficit.  The large-scale production 
systems (the last, pink column) are the second most expensive, at just under $5.1 billion.  
Of the five individual system types, microturbines are the least expensive at just under 
$3.2 billion.   
The one-third mixed strategy offers a cost benefit when compared to the diesel 
generator, PV, wind and other two mixed strategies.  However, microturbines still 
provides a significant cost savings benefit overall when SLM is not considered. 
Using a high security threat matrix evaluation for a generic Iraqi site, SLM’s 
were generated and applied to the LCC values.  Then, as in Figure 18 above, the LCC’s 
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were multiplied times the current 3500MW deficit in Iraq.  The results presented in 
Figure 19, are an analysis of the cost to make up the 3500MW annual supply deficit 
using both homogonous and mixed strategies for a high security threat environment. 
 
Figure 19: Cost to Make up Annual Iraqi Gen. Deficit of 3500MW with 
Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies in a High Security Threat Environment 
Large-scale natural gas systems were rated at a higher threat level because they 
are assumed attractive targets.  This is an assumption well documented in U.S. 
government reports.  Because of this, the large-scale systems, when considered both 
homogeneously and in mixed-strategy, cost more.  In the case of using large-scale 
systems alone to make up the 3500MW deficit, it cost just under $76 billon.  Diesel 
generators provide a less expensive option compared to the large-scale system, because 
they are decentralized, and make a less appealing target.  However, they are still more 
expensive than microturbines, PV and wind.  This is primarily due to the cost of diesel 
fuel.  Microturbines share the same fuel logistics burden that diesel generators do, but 
they benefit from the significantly cheaper price of fuel.   
Wind turbines, while more cost effective than diesel or large-scale systems, are 
less attractive due to their target profile.  In other words, their very design makes them 
an easy target as opposed to PV cells that can be concealed on a rooftop, or a generator 
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that can be housed in a protective building or enclosure.  PV becomes a significantly 
more attractive option because of the lack of fuel and logistics burdens.  Finally, the 
one-third mixed option is only slightly more expensive than using PV alone.   
Figure 20 is similar to the data in Figure 19, except that it has been evaluated for 
a low security threat.  At $16 billion, homogeneous use of microturbines is the most cost 
effective method of reducing the generation deficit.  Large-scale gas turbines are the 
least cost effective in both homogeneous and mixed use at $46.5 and $37 billion, 
respectively.  One-third and one-quarter DG mixed strategies present next best options 
over microturbines, with the one-quarter slightly edging out the one-third.  Finally, 
homogeneous use of diesel generators is more cost effective than PV and wind.   
Decentralized DGs benefit significantly over the centrally located, and 
presumably more easily targeted, large-scale systems.  When fuel logistics becomes less 
of a threat burden, diesel generators become a more attractive option over non-fuel 
consuming systems.  Mixed DG strategies benefit from both decentralization and low 
fuel costs. 
 
Figure 20: Cost to Make Up Annual Iraqi Gen. Deficit of 3500MW with 
Homogeneous and Mixed Strategies in Low Security Threat Environment 
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2.   LCC vs. Fuel Price Analysis 
As realized in the deficit analysis above, fuel prices have a significant impact on 
the LCC of systems that consume fuel.  Base fuel prices in this analysis are constructed 
from the U.S. averages for diesel and natural gas in January 2009, as reported by the 
Energy Information Agency.  It is reasonable to assume that these fuel prices do not 
reflect what is currently being paid in the war-zones of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Indeed, in 
a brief at the Naval Postgraduate School on January 13, 2009, the Secretary of the 
Navy’s Deputy Director for Renewable Energy, Mr. Chris Tindal, stated that the U.S. 
government was paying approximately $44 per gallon for “fuel” in Afghanistan. 
To understand the impact the increase in fuel prices has on system costs, a cost 
comparison was conducted, evaluating the variations in annual levelized LCC ($K/kW) 
versus an incremental increase in fuel prices.  Figure 21 is a $/gal comparison to account 
for diesel generator operating costs, and Figure 22 is a $/MMBTU to account for 
microturbine and large-scale natural gas turbine generator operating costs.  Neither 
includes SLM in the analysis. 
$/fuel type was calculated by taking the January 2009 costs for both diesel and 
natural gas and incrementally adjusting the price by 10%, 100%, 1000% and 2000%.  
By increasing diesel fuel prices from the January 2009 base price of $2.29/gal to 2000% 
of that base price results in a fuel price of $48.11.  This is only a few dollars over the 
current fuel price Deputy Director Tindal referenced.   
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Figure 21: Production Cost Comparison:  Annual LCC ($1K/kW) vs. 
Incremental Increase in Fuel Prices ($/gal) 
Figure 21 shows that as fuel prices increase, base life-cycle costs increase 
linearly.  While the linear relationship is clear, Figure 21 illustrates that, without 
consideration for SLM variations, fuel-consuming systems become less cost effective as 
fuel prices rise, and non-fuel consuming technologies are not impacted. 
Figure 22: Production Cost Comparison:  Annual $1K/kW vs. Incremental 
Increase in Fuel Prices ($/MMBTU) shows, similarly, linear relationships for the natural 
gas burning systems.  The interesting observation here is that large-scale production 
begins to be favored over microturbine use at approximately $50/MMBTU.  Non-SLM 
life-cycle costs are 37% higher for large-scale production over microturbines.  However, 
at the point that fuel prices increase by 1000% from the base price, a downward pressure 
is exerted on the overall LCC of large-scale systems.  Without consideration for security 
as expressed by the security level multiplier (SLM), it seems that large-scale production 
at higher fuel prices is a better economic choice.   
When comparing the y-axis of Figure 21 and Figure 22: Production Cost 
Comparison:  Annual $1K/kW vs. Incremental Increase in Fuel Prices ($/MMBTU), it is 
the case that both natural gas burning systems have significantly lower costs than the 
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diesel system, when not SLM adjusted.  For example, considering a 2000% increase in 
the price of both fuel types, at $48/gal of diesel fuel, diesel levelized annual LCC is 
approximately $30 thousand.  Contrast this to the microturbine system LCC of $10.4 
thousand when fuel prices are $115/MMBTU. 
Regardless of the fuel used, there is a strong argument for wind and PV even 
before fuel prices begin to increase when SLM is not considered. 
 
 
Figure 22: Production Cost Comparison:  Annual $1K/kW vs. Incremental 
Increase in Fuel Prices ($/MMBTU) 
 
F. ANALYSIS OF COSTS 
Figure 23 is a basic cost comparison of the four distributed generation 
technologies alongside the large-scale Iraqi natural gas turbine projects reported on by 
USAID.    This figure does not include SLM data.  It is a comparison of each system in 
terms of capital, O&M, fuel/storage costs, and 14% design/installation security 
premium, in $FY09.   
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As in the analysis above, microturbines are the most cost effective technology.  
This is likely the result of currently low natural gas prices.  The large-scale projects 
benefit from the low fuel prices as well.  However, project costs are inflated due to the 
high capitalization costs, and the short period (5.7 years) before a major overhaul is 
required (EPA 2002).   
Wind and solar appear to be attractive options.  A primary reason for this is the 
lack of a fuel requirement.  Of note is that battery storage costs have only been assigned 
to wind and PV.  If battery storage costs were to be applied to all DG systems, or taken 
away from the solar and PV (an assumption that the systems were connected to the grid 
and the grid took care of peak shaving/non-DG production periods), these charts would 
look very different in favor of PV and wind.   
 
Figure 23: Electrical Generation Cost Comparison without Security Level 
Multiplier (Average K/kW, $FY09) 
G. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES 
The next set of observations focuses on the impact that security alone has on the 
annual levelized life-cycle cost of each system.  Figure 24 is a three-parameter bubble 
chart comparing:   
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1.  LCC, including fuel and SLM, in $K/kW (y-axis).  
2.  SLM, derived from a site-specific matrix-rating tool that has been generalized 
to provide a score indicative of a high security threat environment, such as Iraq (x-axis).  
3.  Pre-SLM costs indicated qualitatively, not quantitatively, by visual inspection 
of the diameter of each bubble.   
Parameter number three is included in order to provide an additional indication 
of how security affects the cost of production.   
Reading the chart is done by observing the vertical position of the ball, which 
corresponds to the LCC.  A ball’s horizontal position corresponds to a system’s SLM , 
which was developed following a threat matrix evaluation.  In this case, generic site 
evaluations were conducted for low- and high-security threat environments based on 
presumed conditions in Iraq.  Finally, ball diameter gives a qualitative comparison of 
what the non-SLM LCC are for each system.   
Figure 24 shows that in a high security threat environment, microturbines, while 
having a higher SLM than PV or wind, at $10.53 million per kW, have a lower LCC.  
PV systems have the lowest SLM, and the next lowest LCC of $11.34 million per kW.  
Diesel generators have high SLM and LCC values.  The least cost effect, and least 
secure system is the large-scale natural gas turbine.  In a high-threat environment, it 
rates a LCC of 21.62, and SLM of over 15.   
In a high security threat environment microturbines appear to have the edge, 
despite the slightly higher security risk due to fuel logistics.  Wind and PV are quite 
competitive compared to small diesel generators and large-scale natural gas turbines.  If 
removing the fuel logistics burden is desired, while still being able to provide supply, 




Figure 24: High Security Threat Impact on Generation Life-Cycle Costs 
Figure 25 is the same as above except that it compares systems is a generic low-
threat environment.  Here, the notable observations are that the large-scale system costs 
nearly three times as much to produce one kilowatt of electricity compared to 
microturbines.  Diesel generators become significantly more attractive, and indeed 
outperform PV and wind in terms of both SLM and LCC.  Microturbines still beat out 




Figure 25: Low Security Threat Impact on Generation Life-Cycle Costs 
 
H. SENSITIVITY AND RISK ANALYSES 
Figure 26 includes the data in Figure 24 above, but compares it to the fuel 
consuming technologies (microturbines, DG diesel generators, and large-scale NG 
turbines) if fuel were to rise by 2000% in a high security threat environment.  As 
previously explained, 2000% was chosen because it increases the January 2009 price of 
diesel fuel from approx. $2.29/gal, to $48.11/gal, a figure validated in a briefing by 
Deputy Director Tindal.     
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An increase in fuel prices by this amount makes production costs of fuel 
consuming systems (circled in red) uncompetitive compared to the unaffected wind and 
PV system.   
Of note is that DG sized diesel generators are significantly more expensive than 
natural gas burning microturbines and large-scale gas turbines.  In all three cases, wind 
and PV systems appear to be the more attractive choice, with PV edging out wind 
turbines. 
 
Figure 26: High Security Threat Production Costs with a 2000% Increase in 
Fuel Prices 
Figure 27 is the same as Figure 26, except that it is evaluated for a low security 
threat environment.  It again shows that inflated fuel rates make fuel-consuming systems 
unappealing.  While microturbines are more appealing than large-scale and diesel 
systems, generation costs for all make PV and wind look like the more attractive choice 
in this case as well. 
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Figure 27: Low Security Threat Production Costs with a 2000% increase in Fuel 
Prices 
I.   ANALYSIS SUMMATION  
To conclude the analysis portion, a stoplight chart has been devised to indicate 
possible preferential technology choices given different sets of variables.  The decision 
variables are divided into six areas for each of the five systems evaluated in this 
research. 
1. Fuel at base-line price and no threat. 
2. Fuel at base-line price and low-threat. 
3. Fuel at base-line price and high-threat. 
4. Fuel at 2000% of base-line price, no threat 
5. Fuel at 2000% of base-line price, low-threat 
6. Fuel at 2000% of base-line price, high-threat 
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Figure 28: System Fuel v. Security Preference Stoplight 
 
Figure 28 shows that at baseline fuel prices ($2.29 FY09) and no security 
constraints, microturbines would be a preferred choice with the lowest annual levelized 
LCC.  The next preferred choice would be PV.  The other three systems offer more 
expensive life-cycle costs, and therefore, a decision based on costs would have to 
eliminate these systems from consideration. 
At a baseline fuel price, and low security threat level, microturbines and diesel 
generators become preferred choices.  In this case, security considerations drive down 
costs on the diesel generator. 
At a baseline fuel price and high security threat, microturbines followed by PV 
again become the preferred system choices. 
Once fuel reaches a 2000% increase over the baseline price, systems that 
consume fuel lose their advantage, regardless of security constraints.  At this point, wind 
















The analysis shows that when fuel prices are low, regardless of the security 
constraints as projected in Chapter III, microturbines have the potential to provide the 
most cost effective way of supplying the electricity required to make up the current 
deficit in Iraq.  The combination of low natural gas prices, and the security benefits of 
decentralized electricity production, give microturbines a distinct advantage over its 
competitors.   
The advantages of microturbines are wiped out when fuel prices increase beyond 
$5.50/MMBTU (FY09).  At that point, despite the technology’s high capital and storage 
costs, PV holds a clear advantage in that it is not impacted by fuel price volatility.  PV 
also has potential security advantages due to its low target profile and ability to be 
decentralized.  What is unknown is how balance of system costs would affect the LCC 
bottom line. 
Diesel generators offer decentralization, which gives it an advantage in a low 
security threat environment.  However, fuel costs and logistic constraints make it a poor 
choice in every other scenario.  Since this type of system is currently the primary means 
of making up the electricity deficit in Iraq right now, it begs the question; how much 
money is being wasted in maintaining the capability?  As noted in Chapter I, officials 
recognize that this is a problem.   
Wind turbines offer similar benefits to PV, including the lack of a fuel 
requirement, and ability to be decentralized.  However, they have twice the O&M costs, 
and offer a large target profile.  Thus, wind turbines fall short of being a cost effective 
solution. 
Finally, large-scale natural gas turbine plants fall short in every category of this 
analysis.  They are expensive to build, hard to secure, and fall prey to fuel logistics 
problems.  Like the other two fuel consuming systems, as fuel prices increase, large-
scale generation becomes even more unattractive. 
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According to the Joint Publication on Multi-Service Concept for Irregular 
Warfare, long-term stability and commitment to rebuilding and investment are required 
to acquire and hold the trust of the population (United States Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge 
and Futures 2006).  Just as there has recently been a call for a change in the way we 
fight wars, there is an equally compelling reason to call for a change in the way in which 
the United States’ invests in reconstruction.  Distributed generation technologies, such 
as microturbines and solar panels, appear to hold the potential to provide a rapid, cost 
effective way to rebuild and expand electrical infrastructure in war-ravaged regions.  It 
stand to reason that the faster the U.S. can rebuild infrastructure, the faster the U.S. can 
win the hearts and minds of the civilian population, and negate the acidic effects of 
irregular warfare efforts by the enemy. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON WORK 
There are several possible avenues for follow-on work.  The following is list of 
some potential topics. 
• There are several types of distributed generation technologies that were 
not covered in this research.  Investigating how additional technologies 
may, or may not, change the results would enrich the potential value of 
this work.  The following are some system recommendations that may be 
feasible for this type of application: 
o Small-scale concentrated solar. 
o Natural gas burning, reciprocating engine, generators. 
o Differentiating amongst various thin-film and traditional PV 
technologies. 
o Small-scale hydro 
o Mini-turbines 
• Energy storage is a vast and complex subject in its own right.   It is also 
going to be a key component to a functioning microgrid system.  While it 
was considered, energy storage should be given a more comprehensive 
analytical treatment in order to develop a more accurate model of how it 
affects the total LCC. 
• Afghanistan suffers from similar problems as Iraq in terms of the 
electrical infrastructure being in disrepair and under attack, and most 
certainly not being able to keep up with demand.  However, unlike Iraq, 
Afghanistan never had a comprehensive generation and grid network.  It 
also presents different meteorological conditions than those in Iraq.  
Therefore, it is probably true that Afghanistan presents a unique 
rebuilding challenge that may have requirement different technologies. 
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• Rebuilding infrastructure means that governments contract out the work 
to civilian companies.  Anecdotally, it seems that companies that 
specialize in traditional power plant construction receive preferential 
access to those contracts.  It would be interesting to include some sort of 
quantitative measurement of this phenomena (if it exists) in order to see 
how it affects the costs associated with constructing new plants. 
• Balance of system (BOS) (i.e., complete network architecture) data is not 
included in the LCC calculations in this paper.  It is recommended that in 
further work on this topic, an attempt is made to gather data on BOS 
equipment, such as inverters, converters, specific storage requirements, 
and connection technologies (wiring). 
• Security threat evaluations were conducted to test the impact of security 
constraints on each system’s LCC.  As noted, the values assigned for 
each threat to a specific system was somewhat arbitrary.  It would be 
useful if a simulation model was created that could derive a wider base of 
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